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I 
 
Sanskrit plays a very special role in the traditional world view of Brahmanism. It is, to 
begin with, the language of the Veda. Since for many Brahmanical thinkers the Veda is 
uncreated and eternal, Sanskrit, too, is without beginning. Other languages are often 
looked upon as corruptions of Sanskrit which, being the source from which other 
languages have derived, better perhaps: degenerated, is the original language.1 
 But Sanskrit is more than just the original language. It is also the language 
which is closest to reality. The words and sentences of the Sanskrit language are 
believed to have some kind of inherent connection with the world we live in. This belief 
is no doubt linked to the belief in the efficacy of mantras, which, when correctly 
pronounced at appropriate occasions, are supposed to have various effects, from 
securing the success of a particular ritual act to curing a disease.2 It also finds 
expression in the numerous etymological and related speculations which fill the 
Bråhmaˆas. The theme that seers have given names to things is no doubt connected 
with this same belief, because it provides something like a justification for it. We find it 
already in the Ùgveda (e.g. 10.71.1).3 We find it also in Yåska's Nirukta, as it seems.4 
Elsewhere the [110] Nirukta refers to seers with direct insight into the nature of things.5 
It is no doubt this insight which allows the seers of the Bråhmaˆas to "see" their hymns 
and "find" rites.6  
                                                
* I thank Jan E. M. Houben for constructive criticism. 
1 See Bronkhorst, 1993a. 
2 For mantras in general, see Alper, 1989. This book contains, besides a number of valuable articles, an 
extremely useful Working Bibliography (pp. 327-443) and Bibliographical List (pp. 444-530). 
3 RV 10.71.1 reads, in the translation of Louis Renou (1956: 71): "O B®haspati, ce fut là le premier 
commencement de la Parole, quand ils (i.e. the first poet-seers, referred to by the word dh¥ra in the next 
stanza; J.B.) se mirent en branle, donnant une dénomination (nåmadhéyaµ dádhånå˙) (aux choses)." See 
further Renou, 1955. 
4 See Bronkhorst, 1996. 
5 Nirukta 1.20: såk∑åtk®tadharmåˆa ®∑ayo babhËvu˙; Falk (1993: 241 = 1990: 108) translates "Persons 
who had direct insight into dharma turned into poets (‘seers’)." 
6 Oldenberg, 1919: 223. 
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 Perhaps the belief in the close connection between language and reality is not all 
that surprising. Psychologists from Jean Piaget onward have drawn attention to what 
they call the nominal realism in young children.7 If young children in the modern West 
need time to separate words from things, perhaps certain other cultures, like that of 
Vedic India, allowed their members to hold on to the essential identity, or 
inseparability, of words and things right into adulthood. 
 Be this as it may. The truly amazing thing in India is that these etymological 
speculations of the Bråhmaˆas, and the presuppositions which underlie them, came to 
be rationalised in respectable branches of knowledge. The first one that comes to mind 
is, of course, the "science of etymology" (nirukta), one of the six so-called "limbs of the 
Veda" (vedå∫ga). This "science of etymology" claims to offer a method to find the 
meanings of unknown words. This method consists, essentially, in drawing other, 
similar, words into the picture whose meanings are known. The principle underlying all 
this can be stated briefly as follows: similar words must have similar meanings. 
Traditional "grammar" (vyåkaraˆa), which is another "limb of the Veda", appears to be 
based on the same principle. Its own contribution consists in the attempt to identify the 
— or rather: a certain number of — constituent parts of words that have meaning, and 
to show how these constituent parts join up so as to produce the words and sentences of 
the Sanskrit language.8 
 The fundamental texts of the disciplines just mentioned do not refer to other 
languages than Sanskrit. They seem to have been composed in surroundings where the 
pre-eminent position of Sanskrit was taken for [111] granted. In an important sense, the 
Vedic tradition hung on to that position. Yet it became ever more difficult to ignore the 
existence of other languages. Another confrontation that it could not avoid, was the one 
with Buddhism, which presented India with an impressive number of ideas that did not 
fail to exert a profound influence on Brahmanism. This influence also concerned the 
relationship between language and reality. In the present paper I will try to draw 
attention to these ideas within Buddhism, and to the way they came to affect 
Brahmanism. Put in a nutshell, Buddhism appears to have led the way, from what we 
might call a belief in some kind of magical connection between language and reality, to 
a philosophically sophisticated theory about that same connection. 
 Let it be clear from the outset that Buddhism never had any special link with the 
Sanskrit language. Its original teachings were expressed in a language, or languages, 
different from Sanskrit, and certain Buddhist schools — prominent among them the 
Theravådins — have never used Sanskrit throughout their long history. Other schools 
                                                
7 See Piaget, 1925. For more recent confirmations, see, e.g., Brook, 1970; Scarlett and Press, 1975; 
Williams, 1977; Ball and Simpson, 1977. 
8 Cf. Bronkhorst, 1981, esp. p. 12. 
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did turn to Sanskrit at some point of their development, without however attributing to 
Sanskrit the special position which it occupied within Brahmanism.9 Buddhist ideas 
about the relationship between language and reality, when they made their appearance, 
were therefore just that, ideas about the relationship between language and reality, and 
not ideas about the relationship between Sanskrit and reality in particular. For these 
ideas to become ideas about Sanskrit in particular, they had to undergo a special 
adaptation, to which I will turn later on in this lecture. 
 Before that, we have to consider the question how and why ideas about language 
and reality found their way into Buddhism at all. Buddhism is, first of all, a religion 
which teaches a path leading to the cessation of suffering and rebirth. Nothing in the 
early texts suggests that reflection on the relationship between language and reality was 
part of that path. For the origins of these ideas, we have to look at the special way the 
Buddhist message came to be handed down, and modified in the process. In their efforts 
to preserve the teaching of the Buddha, the early Buddhists were not content to 
memorise his own words. They also [112] enumerated the elements contained in his 
teaching, and this led to the creation of lists of so-called dharmas, elaborately discussed 
in the canonical Abhidharma-Pi†akas and subsequent literature. This activity, whose 
only intention may have been to preserve the teaching of the Buddha, yet resulted in 
theoretical developments, which one could globally refer to as the dharma-theory. For 
reasons that cannot be discussed here at present, the dharma-theory came to assume an 
ontological dimension. The dharmas came to be looked upon as the only really existing 
"elements of existence", which is, incidentally, the expression that is not infrequently 
used to translate the Buddhist term dharma. At this point Buddhism had become a 
philosophy — or at least it now included a philosophy — which possessed detailed lists 
of what there is. Things that do not figure in the lists of dharmas do not really exist, and 
this forced the Buddhist thinkers to deny the reality of all composite objects, which 
includes most objects of ordinary experience. This, in its turn, evoked the question why 
everyone seems to be subject to the same delusion: everybody believes that there are 
houses and chariots and the like in a world, which, in reality, does not contain any of 
these. The answer that the Buddhist thinkers proposed to this question is of particular 
interest to us in the present context. All these composite objects, which do not really 
exist, exist in name only; they are prajñaptisat.10  
 Probably the most charming passage in early Buddhist literature dealing with 
the problem here presented, occurs in the Påli version of the "Questions of King 
Milinda", the Milindapañha. The meeting of the Buddhist monk Någasena with the 
                                                
9 A certain distaste for non-aryan languages and for the speakers thereof is sometimes noticeable; see 
Lamotte, 1970: XI, 1583 f., 1585-86 n. 3. 
10 In the following remarks on the role of language in Buddhist thought, I follow to a large extent two 
articles by Paul M. Williams (1980, 1981). See further Harris, 1991: 93 ff.; Lindtner, 1992: 264 ff. 
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Indo-Greek king Menander as described in this text contains the following passages, in 
the slightly modified translation of T. W. Rhys Davids:11 
 
 "Now Milinda the king went up to where the venerable Någasena was, and addressed 
him with the greetings and compliments of friendship [113] and courtesy, and took his seat 
respectfully apart. And Någasena reciprocated his courtesy, so that the heart of the king was 
propitiated. 
 And Milinda began by asking: ‘How is your Reverence known, and what, Sir, is your 
name?’ 
 ‘I am known as Någasena, O king, and it is by that name that my brethren in the faith 
address me. But although parents, O king, give such a name as Någasena, or SËrasena, or 
V¥rasena, or S¥hasena, yet this, Sire,—Någasena and so on—is only a generally understood 
term, a designation in common use. For no person is observed here.’ 
 [At this point king Milinda utters his scepticism with regard to the opinion expressed by 
Någasena, and questions the latter as to his relationship with the constituent parts. Någasena 
then answers as follows:] 
 ‘You, Sire, have been brought up in great luxury, as beseems your noble birth. If you 
were to walk this dry weather on the hot and sandy ground, trampling under foot the gritty, 
gravelly grains of the hard sand, your feet would hurt you. And as your body would be in pain, 
your mind would be disturbed, and you would experience a sense of bodily suffering. How then 
did you come, on foot, or in a chariot?’ 
 ‘I did not come, Sir, on foot. I came in a carriage.’ 
 ‘Then if you came, Sire, in a carriage, explain to me what that is. Is it the pole that is 
the chariot?’ 
 ‘I did not say that.’ 
 ‘Is it the axle that is the chariot?’ 
 ‘Certainly not.’ 
 ‘Is it the wheels, or the framework, or the ropes, or the yoke, or the spokes of the 
wheels, or the goad, that are the chariot?’ 
 And to all these he still answered no. 
 ‘Then is it all these parts of it that are the chariot?’ 
 ‘No, Sir.’ 
 ‘But is there anything outside them that is the chariot?’ 
 And still he answered no. 
 ‘Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no chariot. Chariot is a mere empty sound. 
What then is the chariot you say you came in? It is a falsehood that your Majesty has spoken, an 
untruth! You are king over all India, a mighty monarch. Of whom then are you afraid that you 
speak untruth?’ ... 
 And Milinda the king replied to Någasena, and said: ‘I have spoken no untruth, 
reverend Sir. It is on account of its having all these things—the pole, and the axle, the wheels, 
and the framework, the ropes, the yoke, the spokes, and the goad—that it comes under the 
generally understood term, the designation in common use, of 'chariot'.’ 
 ‘Very good! Your Majesty has rightly grasped the meaning of 'chariot'. And just even 
so it is on account of having hair, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, nerves, bones, marrow, kidneys, heart, 
liver, abdomen, [114] spleen, lungs, larger intestines, lower intestines, stomach, faeces, bile, 
phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, serum, saliva, mucus, oil that lubricates the joints, urine, 
brain, outward form, sensations, ideas, confections, and consciousness that I come under the 
generally understood term, the designation in common use, of 'Någasena'.’" 
 
Many other Buddhist texts repeat, be it usually in a less attractive garb, the message 
which we learn from the Milindapañha: composite objects exist in name only. Already 
a passage in the Saµyutta Nikåya states that "just as the word ‘chariot’ is used when the 
parts are put together, so there is the use of the conventional expression ‘being’ when 
the constituents of a person are present".12 A hut, we read in the Íåriputråbhidharma, is 
                                                
11 Milindapañha (p. 25 f.); tr. Rhys Davids, 1890: 40 f. The Chinese version is to be found TI 1670, vol. 
32, p. 696a l. 5 f.; p. 706a l. 9 f.; French translation by Demiéville (1924: 97 f.). Oetke (1988: 185 f.) has 
however shown, "dass an keiner Stelle der chinesischen Version ... eine These ausgesprochen oder 
angedeutet wird, die mit der, dass ein Pudgala nicht existiert, äquivalent ist". 
12 SN I.135: yathå hi a∫gasambhårå hoti saddo ratho iti evaµ khandesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti. 
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nothing but a designation.13 The Mahåvibhå∑å illustrates the category of nominal 
existence (prajñaptisat) by enumerating the objects "vase, cloth, chariot, army, forest, 
hut etc.".14 The Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya explains that a composite object is prajñaptisat, 
not dravyasat.15  
 For most Buddhists belonging to the mainstream,16 the only things that really 
exist, not only in name, are the dharmas. The following extract from a passage of the 
Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya expresses this clearly:17 [115] "Where the idea of an object is 
no longer present when the object is broken into pieces, that object exists only 
relatively (saµv®tisat); an example is a vase. ... Where the idea of an object is no longer 
present when one removes the other dharmas mentally, that object, too, is to be looked 
upon as existing only relatively; an example is water. ... To these objects a conventional 
name has been given. ... In cases different from these there is absolute truth. Where the 
idea of an object is present even when the object is broken, or when one removes the 
other dharmas mentally, that object exists absolutely; an example is colour." The older 
Saµyuktåbhidharmah®daya, from which the Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya has borrowed 
extensively, has a similar passage, which, however, speaks of names rather than ideas: 
in case the name of an object is no longer present when it is analysed, that object exists 
relatively only.18 
 Here it is important to emphasise that reflections on the relationship between 
composite wholes and their parts are not marginal to Buddhist thought. Quite on the 
contrary, they are central to it, from an early date onward. The oldest parts of the 
Milindapañha may go back as far as the second century before our era. If the passage 
which I just read out to you belongs to the oldest kernel, which seems likely, it 
constitutes evidence that the concern with parts and wholes was already well 
established at that early date. 
 This date finds confirmation elsewhere. The school of thought which works out 
the dharma-theory in most rigorous detail is the one called Sarvåstivåda. From among 
                                                
13 TI 1548, vol. 28, p. 626c l. 11-12. 
14 TI 1545, vol. 27, p. 42b l. 1-2. Cp. the following statements from the same text, translated by La Vallée 
Poussin (1937: 166-67): "Le Bhadanta Vasumitra dit: ‘Le nom qui désigne est saµv®ti ...’"; "Bhadanta 
dit: ‘Parler d'être vivant (sattva), de cruche, de vêtement et autres choses, expressions (vyavahåra) 
produites par une pensée non-fausse, c'est saµv®tisatya; ...’"; "Le Bhadanta Dharadatta dit: ‘Le nom, de 
sa nature (nåmasvabhåva), est saµv®ti; ...’"Also the Vibhå∑å refers to the principle "Toutes choses sont 
vides et sans-soi"; see La Vallée Poussin, 1937: 164. 
15 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 13 l. 24-25, on verse 1.20: yadi råßyartha˙ skandhårtha˙ prajñaptisanta˙ skandhå˙ 
pråpnuvanti/ anekadravyasamËhatvåt råßipudgalavat/ 
16 Following Harrison (1990: xviii n. 8; 1992: 77-78 n. 8) I use this term here to refer to what is often 
called Íråvakayåna or H¥nayåna. 
17 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 334 l. 3-9, on verse 6.4: yasminn avayavaßo bhinne na tadbuddhir bhavati tat 
saµv®tisat/ tad yathå gha†a˙/ .../ tatra cånyån apohya dharmån buddhyå tadbuddhir na bhavati tac cåpi 
saµv®tisad veditavyam/ tad yathåmbu˙/ .../ te∑v eva tu saµv®tisaµjñå k®t[å] .../ ato 'nyathå 
paramårthasatyam/ tatra bhinne 'pi tadbuddhir bhavaty eva/ anyadharmåpohe 'pi buddhyå tat 
paramårthasat/. 
18 TI 1552, vol. 28, p. 958b l. 8 f.; cf. Dessein, 1994: I, 2, p. 802. 
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the texts just mentioned the Mahåvibhå∑å, and to some extent also the 
Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya, belong to this school. There is independent evidence to believe 
that the essential features of this school, too, were already in place in the middle of the 
second century before our era.19 These essential features show that this school, too, had 
consciously rejected the existence of composite wholes at that time. Note here that 
followers of the Sarvåstivåda school of Buddhist thought continued to write detailed, 
and voluminous, treatises until beyond the middle of the first millennium of our era. 
The school led therefore a vigorous life for seven or eight centuries, and had plenty of 
opportunity to influence other thinkers, both Buddhists and non-Buddhists. We will 
come back to this in a while. 
[116] 
 But the preoccupation with the relationship between parts and composite whole 
went on to characterise other developments within Buddhism as well. A particularly 
momentous development was the arising of what came to be known as Mahåyåna, to be 
distinguished from the mainstream (Íråvakayåna or H¥nayåna), to which schools like 
the Sarvåstivåda belonged. Several theoretical developments came to be associated with 
the Mahåyåna. Recall that the non-existence of composite objects in Buddhism was 
assimilated to the rejection of the existence of the person. This is clear from the 
Milindapañha passage which I read to you, but also from other Buddhist texts. Other 
Buddhists, primarily those belonging to the Mahåyåna, went further. They, too, rejected 
the full existence of the person and of composite objects (pudgalanairåtmya). But in 
addition to this, they claimed the essencelessness of the dharmas (dharmanairåtmya). 
For them, the challenge to account for reality as we experience it became even greater 
than it had been, and continued to be, for the mainstream Buddhists. Not even the 
ultimate constituents of all there is, the dharmas, could now be accepted as really 
existing any more. 
 The non-existence of the dharmas is often mentioned in the early 
Prajñåpåramitå-SËtras.20 The dharmas are described as ‘empty’,21 ‘without own reality’ 
(asvabhåva),22 ‘empty of own reality’ (svabhåvaßËnya),23 ‘without self’ (niråtmaka),24 
etc. We learn from at least one passage that ‘self’ (åtman/pudgala) and ‘aggregate’ 
(piˆ∂a) — i.e., ‘whole’, ‘composite entity’ — are identical.25 The ‘self’ is the 
‘aggregate’; the text considers both of them ultimately unreal. 
                                                
19 Bronkhorst, 1987: 71. 
20 E.g. Suvikråntavikråmiparip®cchå ch. 1, p. 9 l. 26, l. 30 f.; p. 10 l. 22. 
21 E.g. A∑†asåhasrikå ch. 18, p. 172 l. 15-20, p. 173 l. 3 f . 
22 E.g. A∑†asåhasrikå ch. 18, p. 173 l. 3; Suvikråntavikråmiparip®cchå ch. 1, p. 10 l. 22. 
23 E.g. Prajñåpåramitåh®daya SËtra (long version), p. 98 l. 13. 
24 Vajracchedikå Prajñåpåramitå 17, p. 85 l. 2 and 7; 28, p. 88 l. 9. 
25 Vajracchedikå Prajñåpåramitå 30-31, p. 89 l. 2-6: bhagavån åha: piˆ∂agråhaß caiva subhËte avyavahåro 
'nabhilåpya˙/ na sa dharmo nådharma˙/ sa ca bålap®thagjanair udg®h¥ta˙/ tat kasya heto˙? yo hi kaßcit 
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[117] 
 In this vision of the world, then, neither composite objects nor constituents 
really exist. This includes the dharmas, the ultimate constituents for most of the main 
stream Buddhists. The texts identify the dharmas with empty space (åkåßa) which, for 
them, is non-existence (abhåva).26 According to the A∑†asåhasrikå (ch. 13, p. 139 l. 10 
f.) all dharmas are identical with empty space (åkåßasama); this is why one cannot 
count them, and why they have no measure (pramåˆa). 
 How does the Mahåyåna explain the phenomenal world? Here, too, it is 
language which plays an essential role. The "Maitreya-chapter" of the 
Pañcaviµßatisåhasrikå states that all things up to the Buddhadharmas are nothing but 
names.27 Designations, moreover, depend upon the analytic imagination (vikalpa).28 
According to the commentary by Devaßarman on the Madhyamakakårikå, cited in the 
Prajñåprad¥pa of Bhåvaviveka (Bhavya), the aim of the text commented upon is to 
destroy adherence to language and to the referents of language.29 The 
Madhyamakåvatåra of Candrak¥rti cites, under 6.68, a SËtra in which the Buddha 
declares that absolutely everything is nothing but name (prajñapti); things do not really 
exist and it is the linguistic referent which logicians (tårkika) misconceive as being the 
real thing.30 Elsewhere in the same chapter, Candrak¥rti observes: "Its own being is 
inaccessible to words. Since the name (abhidhåna) aims at grasping the form of the 
‘objects of naming’ (prajñaptisat), as long as there is naming, one does not speak of 
reality."31 According to the Prasannapadå of the same author, "emptiness itself is 
defined as metaphorical naming. The wheel and the other parts of a chariot are the 
substrate of naming. This naming of the chariot on the substrate of its parts [signifies] 
its non-production as being in itself; and the non-production as being in itself is 
emptiness".32 Saµsåra, too, is nothing but a name [118] (saµjñåmåtrakam), according 
to the Prasannapadå under verse 11.2. According to a text cited in the Íik∑åsamuccaya 
                                                                                                                                         
subhËte evaµ vadet: åtmad®∑†is tathågatena bhå∑itå, sattvad®∑†ir j¥vad®∑†i˙ pudgalad®∑†is tathågatena 
bhå∑itå, api nu sa subhËte samyag vadamåno vadet? subhËtir åha: no h¥daµ bhagavan, no h¥daµ sugata, 
na samyag vadamåno vadet/ "... One should neither speak of nor discuss the acceptance of aggregates 
(piˆ∂a). The aggregate is neither a dharma nor a non-dharma. It is accepted by fools and stupid people. 
Why? He who says that the Tathågata teaches the belief in the self (åtman), in a being (sattva), in the soul 
(j¥va), in the person (pudgala), ... he would not speak the truth." 
26 See, e.g., Suvikråntavikråmiparip®cchå ch. 4, p. 28 l. 1. 
27 Conze and Iida, 1968: 234 (section II.6), 238 (section IV.39). 
28 Id. p. 238 (section IV.40): vikalpa(µ?) prat¥tya abhilapanatå. 
29 Cited by Williams (1980: 36 fn. 1): de la dgag par bya ba ni gyis te/ brjod pa la mngon par zhen pa 
dang/ brjod par bya ba la mngon par zhen pa'o/ 
30 Madhyamakåvatåra p. 160 l. 9-12; tr. La Vallée Poussin, 1910: 344-45. Williams (1980: 37 fn. 29) 
explains that btags represents prajñapti. 
31 Madhyamakåvatåra p. 139 l. 15-18; tr. La Vallée Poussin, 1910: 328. 
32 Prasannapadå under verse 24.18, ed. Vaidya p. 246 (ed. La Vallée Poussin p. 504): saiva ßËnyatå 
upådåya prajñaptir iti vyavasthåpyate/ cakråd¥ny upådåya rathå∫gåni ratha˙ prajñapyate/ tasya yå 
svå∫gåny upådåya prajñapti˙ så svabhåvenånutpatti˙ yå ca svabhåvenånutpatti˙ så ßËnyatå/ Cf. May, 
1959: 239. 
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of Íåntideva, everything is vyavahåramåtra, nåmadheyamåtra, saµketamåtra, 
saµv®timåtra, prajñaptimåtra; that is to say, nothing but words.33 
 The *Mahåprajñåpåramitåßåstra attributed to Någårjuna contains a whole series 
of remarks about the relation between language and the world. The following one gives 
its position in a nutshell:34 "The ignorant pursue names while what they seek is reality." 
 The above citations are from works belonging to the Madhyamaka school of 
Buddhist thought. Passages could also be cited from Vijñånavåda works, but this would 
take us too far afield.35 Be it here noted that the Vijñånavåda frequently speaks of 
vijñapti "phenomenon, percept"36 rather than prajñapti.37 The world is then described as 
vijñaptimåtra "nothing but percepts". The connection between the two can be seen as 
follows. If things exist in name only, it is us who give those names. In other words, we 
create things, which are really nothing but our percepts.38 D.T. Suzuki has indeed been 
able to show that vijñaptimåtra and prajñaptimåtra are often synonyms, at least in the 
La∫kåvatåra SËtra.39 
 I conclude this survey with a verse from the MËlamadhyamakakårikå of 
Någårjuna, which appears to state that the false reality evoked by language is yet 
necessary in order to reach the highest aim. The verse reads: "Without relying on 
linguistic usage (vyavahåra), the [119] highest truth (paramårtha) cannot be taught. 
Without obtaining the highest truth, nirvåˆa cannot be reached."40 
 All these passages are meant to show that the relationship between words and 
things in Buddhism, from at least the second century before our era onward, was 
intimately linked to another major concern of the Buddhist thinkers: the relationship 
between composite wholes and their parts. Composite wholes were not accepted to 
have real existence — this was the result of a particular interpretation of the doctrine of 
non-self, which we find already in the earliest Buddhist texts — and words were 
invoked to explain the universal belief in the existence of such non-existing entities. I 
wish to emphasise again that this complex of ideas was not marginal to Buddhist 
thought; it was not a set of ideas that someone may have had at some time, and which 
has left some traces in the texts. Quite on the contrary, these ideas pervade the Buddhist 
                                                
33 Íik∑åsamuccaya (ed. Vaidya) p. 137 l. 12-13. 
34 Ramanan, 1966: 73. The whole of chapter II of this book, "Concepts and conventional entities (Nåma 
and Lak∑aˆa)" (p. 70-88), is of interest in the present context. 
35 See, e.g., La Vallée Poussin, 1910: 328; 1928-29: 554; 1933: 94; Lamotte, 1935: 188, 190. On the 
continuity between the two schools, see Harris, 1991. 
36 This is the interpretation proposed by B.C. Hall (1986), followed by R.P. Hayes (1988: 99-100). 
37 On the historical relation between prajñaptimåtra and vijñaptimåtra, see Schmithausen, 1973: 171. 
38 Cp. Frauwallner, 1956: 268-69. 
39 Suzuki, 1930: 181. 
40 MadhK(deJ) 24.10: vyavahåram anåßritya paramårtho na deßyate/ paramårtham anågamya nirvåˆaµ 
nådhigamyate// Candrak¥rti's Prasannapadå explains vyavahåra as 
abhidhånåbhidheyajñånajñeyådilak∑aˆa. 
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texts from a certain date onward, and belong apparently to the very essence of that 
which occupied Buddhist thinkers for a very long time. 
 
 
II 
 
I will now turn to a completely different system of thought, to the Brahmanical school 
known by the name of Vaiße∑ika. In a recent article I have argued that this system of 
philosophy may have been created under the influence of Sarvåstivåda.41 The reason I 
offered is that Vaiße∑ika is to a large extent based on four axioms, which can be looked 
upon as either straight borrowings of, or reactions against, axioms of the 
Sarvåstivådins. Two of these axioms are of special interest in the present context. 
Recall first that the Sarvåstivådins — like most other Buddhists — rejected the 
existence of composite wholes besides their ultimate constituents, the dharmas. 
Composite objects exist in name only. In Vaiße∑ika, on the other hand, composite 
objects are as real as their constituents, and exist alongside them. The vase is different 
from the two halves that it is composed of; together they constitute three entities. It 
goes without saying that the world as conceived by the [120] Vaiße∑ikas contains far 
more objects than the world of the Sarvåstivådins. The latter could make an inventory 
of all there is, by basing themselves on their lists of dharmas. These dharmas, they 
believed, had been made known by the omniscient Buddha. The Vaiße∑ikas, too, 
presented a list of categories which constituted, in their opinion, a list of all there is. 
The question is: how could the Vaiße∑ikas find out what filled their far more crowded 
world? 
 Their answer is directly relevant to the theme of this symposium. It is: the 
Sanskrit language. The Sanskrit language allowed them to find out what exists. I shall 
give some examples in a minute. Let me first, however, emphasise the parallelism and 
difference of this position as compared to that of the Sarvåstivådins. The Vaiße∑ikas 
accept the link between composite objects and words postulated by the Sarvåstivådins. 
But whereas the latter reject the real existence of composite objects, and assign no other 
role to words than that of explaining our common error, for the former composite 
objects are part of reality, and words are the key that gives access to that reality. This 
they explain by pointing out that names were given by seers who could perceive 
everything.42 This in [121] its turn explains why the Vaiße∑ika texts frequently 
                                                
41 Bronkhorst, 1992b. 
42 Vaiße∑ika SËtra (ed. Jambuvijaya) 2.1.18-19: saµjñåkarma tv asmadvißi∑†ånåµ li∫gam/ 
pratyak∑apËrvakatvåt saµjñåkarmaˆa˙/. See also Wezler, 1985. The theme of seers who have given 
names to things is already present in the Ùgveda and other early texts, as we have seen. Other texts take 
over the same theme. The Yuktid¥pikå (ed. Pandeya, p. 5 l. 9 f.) ascribes the original function of naming 
SANSKRIT AND REALITY  10 
 
 
emphasise that this or that ontological situation justifies this or that current expression. 
The quality p®thaktva (separateness), for example, explains that people speak of 
distinction. Sometimes the reasoning works in the opposite direction: the fact that the 
personal pronoun "I" cannot be used in apposition with some such term as "earth", 
proves that the soul is different from the body. Many further examples could be 
adduced to illustrate the parallelism between words and things from the Vaiße∑ika point 
of view, but they tend to be rather technical; I will not, therefore, harass you with more 
of them.43 But I would like to add one more observation: even though the texts are not 
explicit about this, the conscious belief in the intimate connection between words and 
things may explain why the three most important (and perhaps oldest) categories of 
Vaiße∑ika — substance (dravya), quality (guˆa) and movement (karman) — correspond 
to the three main types of words: nouns, adjectives and verbs. 
 The Vaiße∑ikas do not, not at least in their early surviving texts, contrast 
Sanskrit with other languages. And indeed, one may wonder whether Sanskrit in 
particular is a vital ingredient of their belief in the correspondence between language 
and reality. This correspondence is usually conceived of as the relationship between 
names and what is named by them: nouns, adjectives and verbs, for example, name the 
different kinds of things that constitute objective reality. Different languages use 
different ‘names’; this much is clear. But do these different ‘names’ correspond to 
different ‘objects’? Jan Houben has recently drawn attention to the fact that early Indian 
thinkers — he speaks of Bhart®hari in particular, but the grammarian Patañjali, too, can 
be included — did not show much appreciation for the variations of structure of 
different languages.44 Different languages are often presented as collections of 
                                                                                                                                         
things to the supreme seer (paramar∑i), who is, of course, Kapila. The Mahåbhårata (12.262.8), probably 
inspired by the Nirukta passage cited earlier, states that the seer Kapila had an an insight into the nature 
of things (pratyak∑adharma); the Mahåbhå∑ya (ed. Kielhorn vol. I p. 11 l. 11 f.) uses the same expression 
(here pratyak∑adharman) in connection with seers known as yarvåˆas tarvåˆas (so Cardona, 1990: 7 and 
16 n. 24). The Nyåya Bhå∑ya use the same expression as the Nirukta (såk∑åtk®tadharman) with reference 
to "reliable persons" (åpta); see Franco, 1994: 241. See further Ruegg, 1994, 1994a; also Bhart®hari's 
Våkyapad¥ya 1.37-38; 3.1.46; Houben, 1997. Isaacson, 1993, has drawn attention to the fact that yogic 
perception has played a role in Vaiße∑ika from an early date onward. The idea that poets have a special 
insight into the nature of things was to have a long life in India. Råjaßekhara, the author of the treatise on 
poetry called Kåvyam¥måµså (9th or 10th century C.E.), observes in chapter 12 (p. 62, l. 17 - p. 63, l. 1; 
tr. Granoff, 1995: 364): "The true poetic eye, gained from propitiation of the goddess Sarasvat¥, without 
need of external aids reveals things that have been directly experienced by the poet and things that the 
poet has never even experienced before, in a process that is beyond the range of human conception and 
cannot be described in words. For it is said that the goddess Sarasvat¥ reveals even to the sleeping poet 
both the theme of his poem and the language in which to express it. But others though awake are as if 
blind. For this reason it is said that really great poets are blind to things that have already been seen by 
others, but possess a kind of divine sight that enables them to perceive that which no one before them has 
ever seen. Even the Three-eyed God Íiva or Indra with his thousand eyes cannot see that which mortal 
poets see with their ordinary eyes. In the mirror that is the mind of poets the whole universe is reflected. 
Words and what they express vie with each other in their rush to be present to great minded poets. Poets 
explore with their words that which yogins see through the power of their religious accomplishments. 
And so the words of great poets are potentially infinite." 
43 See Bronkhorst, 1992b: 99 f., for these and other examples. 
44 Houben, 1993: 149 f. 
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deviations of individual words. Seen in this way, reality [122] corresponds to other 
languages as much as it corresponds to Sanskrit, precisely because they do not differ 
from it in a manner which would affect this correspondence. Having said this, it is of 
course important to add that for the Vaiße∑ikas there could be no doubt as to which 
language the original seers used while naming objects: this was of course Sanskrit. 
 One more question must here be addressed. How certain is it that Vaiße∑ika was 
indeed created under the influence of Sarvåstivåda Buddhism, and not, for example, 
under the influence of other schools, such as Såµkhya or the Jainas? This question has 
actually been raised in a recent publication, and at first sight it seems reasonable 
enough.45 I would therefore like to use the present opportunity to add some reflections 
to the ones which I have presented in my earlier publication referred to above. These 
reflections do not, of course, exhaust the question. I will concentrate on the issue that 
has occupied us all along in this lecture, the question of the relationship between 
composite wholes and their parts. For reasons special to the history of Buddhism in 
India, this issue became of the greatest interest to the Buddhists. We find it back, in a 
different form, in Vaiße∑ika, but it is virtually absent in Såµkhya.46 This as much as 
rules out Såµkhya. Jainism seems to side with Vaiße∑ika in some of its texts, but there 
is no indication that I know of suggesting that this issue was of any particular 
importance to them, as it was to the Buddhists and to the Vaiße∑ikas. To this I should 
add, that there is no evidence that Såµkhya and Jainism had developed any form of 
systematisation at the early date mentioned above for Sarvåstivåda (2nd cent. B.C.E.!). 
Not even in later Jainism is there, to my knowledge, a tendency to exhaustively 
enumerate all elements of existence. This development is, in Buddhism, linked to the 
dharma-theory and to the particular interpretation of the doctrine of non-self, neither of 
which have a parallel in Jainism. Moreover, hypotheses about the early development of 
Jainism are extremely precarious. Even their canonical texts — according to the 
Ívetåmbaras who, contrary to the Digambaras, believed that they had been preserved at 
all — were not written down until the fifth century of our era.47 Having said that, I fully 
[123] agree that the historical relationship between Vaiße∑ika and Jainism needs further 
exploration, and may yet throw new light on unresolved issues. I do not, however, 
expect that such research will produce reasons to think that Vaiße∑ika was more than 
marginally indebted to Jainism. And even if the Jaina tradition to the extent that the 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra was (wholly or partly) composed by the Jaina schismatic Rohagupta 
                                                
45 Houben 1995: 733 n. 29. 
46 According to SK 10, the manifest (vyakta) has parts (såvayava), whereas the non-manifest (avyakta) 
has not. SK 17 adds that aggregates exist for the sake of something else (saµghåtaparårthatvåt), and 
concludes from this that the puru∑a exists. 
47 On the late date of at least some Jaina canonical texts, see Bronkhorst, 1995: 1039-40. 
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were to be true,48 this would only shift the problem, and one might still hold on to the 
view that the system was created under the influence of the Sarvåstivåda, this time by a 
schismatic Jaina. Of course, one cannot completely exclude the possibility that another 
Buddhist school, different from Sarvåstivåda, constituted the main influence on 
Vaiße∑ika. 
 There is one further argument, one that has a direct bearing on the theme of this 
paper. Vaiße∑ika postulates, or presupposes, a direct correspondence between words and 
things. So do Sarvåstivåda and other Buddhist schools, be it that for them the things in 
the world do not really exist. Neither Såµkhya nor Jainism entertained the idea of such 
a correspondence, so far as I am aware. They certainly did not emphasise the existence 
and importance of such a correspondence, as did the Buddhists. This is not surprising, 
for they had no need for such an assumption. The Buddhists of this time, on the other 
hand, needed this assumption very much, and indeed, their world view depended on it 
in a crucial manner. The same assumption resurfaces in Vaiße∑ika. Is it not reasonable 
to conclude that Vaiße∑ika stood under Buddhist influence? 
 
 
III 
 
At this point we have to return for a minute to the Buddhist thinkers. We have seen that, 
from an early date onward, all of them agreed on the relationship between the 
phenomenal world and the words of language. I say on purpose "the words of 
language", and not just "language", for the interest of many of them appears to have 
been limited to words only. We believe in the existence of chariots, because there is a 
word for it. Combinations of words, primarily sentences, do not play a role in these 
reflections. 
[124] 
 This changes with Någårjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka school of 
Buddhist thought. Någårjuna no doubt believed, like his fellow-Buddhists, that the 
phenomenal world corresponds to the words of language, and is not ultimately real. But 
he went further. By analysing certain sentences, he could prove the unreality of the 
phenomenal world. No need to add that, while analysing these sentences, he started 
from the presupposition which he shared with his fellow-Buddhists, and perhaps with 
others as well, the presupposition namely that language and the phenomenal world 
somehow correspond to each other. Analysing sentences became in that way a form of 
analysing the phenomenal world. 
                                                
48 See Leumann, 1885: 116-123, and Mehta and Chandra, 1972: 646 (s.v. Rohagutta), 664 (s.v. 
Vaisesiya). Cp. Schubring, 1935: 13. 
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 Någårjuna's thought can be illustrated with the help of the statement: "A sound 
is produced". For Någårjuna, there must be a sound for it to be produced. But if the 
sound is already there, it does not have to come into existence. This is presented as an 
unresolvable contradiction.49 Elsewhere Någårjuna analyses the (perhaps somewhat 
artificial) statement: "He travels the road that is being travelled". This is only possible, 
Någårjuna maintains, if there are two acts of travelling going on: this because the verb 
‘travel’ occurs twice in the statement.50 He concludes from this that neither travelling, 
nor traveller, nor indeed the road to be travelled exist.51 These two simple examples 
allow us to see that Någårjuna takes the close correspondence between statements and 
phenomenal reality for granted. A more detailed study of Någårjuna's 
MËlamadhyamakakårikå brings indeed to light, that something like the following 
presupposition underlies a number of its arguments: the words of a true sentence must 
correspond to objects in the phenomenal world while, and as long as, the sentence is 
true.52 This is in itself not at all surprising, I repeat, for many of his contemporaries, 
among them prac[125]tically all Buddhists, would agree that phenomenal reality 
corresponds to language. Någårjuna merely extends this belief, by including whole 
statements. Subsequently he shows that the belief in the precise correspondence 
between statements and phenomenal reality leads to unacceptable contradictions. He 
does not conclude from this that there may not, after all, be such precise 
correspondence between statements and phenomenal reality, as we perhaps would. 
Quite on the contrary, he sees this as a confirmation of his conviction that the 
phenomenal world does not really exist. But whereas for his predecessors phenomenal 
reality corresponds to the words of language, for Någårjuna and his followers 
phenomenal reality corresponds both to its words and its sentences. 
 
 
IV 
 
With this in mind we turn to another Brahmanical thinker who, as it seems to me, has 
been profoundly influenced by Buddhist ideas.53 This is Bhart®hari, the linguistic 
                                                
49 See e.g. MadhK(deJ) 7.17: yadi kaßcid anutpanno bhåva˙ saµvidyate kvacit/ utpadyeta sa kiµ tasmin 
bhåva utpadyate 'sati// "If something that has not come into existence exists somewhere, it may come into 
existence. Since no such thing exists, what is it that comes into existence?" 
50 MadhK(deJ) 2.5: gamyamånasya gamane prasaktaµ gamanadvayam/ yena tad gamyamånaµ ca yac 
cåtra gamanaµ puna˙// "If one can travel the road that is being travelled, there would be two acts of 
traveling: the one by which the road is being travelled, and the traveling on it." 
51 MadhK(deJ) 2.25cd: tasmåd gatiß ca gantå ca gantavyaµ ca na vidyate. 
52 See Bronkhorst, 1997. 
53 For the argument here presented it is not important to know whether Bhart®hari was directly acquainted 
with Någårjuna's works. Någårjuna's style of reasoning left a profound impression on Buddhist thought 
after him, so that Bhart®hari may have undergone his influence indirectly. Some features of Bhart®hari's 
thought suggest that he may have been acquainted with one or more Yogåcåra thinkers; see below. 
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thinker par excellence of classical India. Bhart®hari stood, in fact, under the influence of 
both Vaiße∑ika and Buddhism, not to speak of several other currents of thought. The 
extent to which he is indebted to Vaiße∑ika is evident on almost every page of his 
Våkyapad¥ya. The Buddhist influence is less immediately obvious, but not any the less 
important, as it appears to me. I have drawn attention to Bhart®hari's indebtedness to 
Buddhist thought in an earlier publication.54 In the present lecture I will try to show 
how Bhart®hari, at least where ideas concerning the relationship between language and 
phenomenal reality are concerned, remains closer to the Buddhists than to the 
Vaiße∑ikas. I will also point out how he adapts these essentially Buddhist ideas to his 
own vision of the world. We will see that Bhart®hari accepts the close correspondence 
between language and phenomenal reality, that, like the Buddhists, he looks upon 
phenomenal reality as ultimately unreal, and that, like Någårjuna, he includes 
sen[126]tences in the parts of language that correspond to the phenomenal world. 
 For Bhart®hari the world, and each object in it, has two aspects: the one real, the 
other unreal. VP 3.1.32, for example, speaks of "the real and the unreal parts which are 
present in each thing".55 The phenomenal world is unreal. It is the result of an (unreal) 
division of the undivided absolute:56 "The Vedåntins base themselves on the truth of 
that object, in which seer, seen and seeing are not differentiated (avikalpita)." It seems 
likely that Bhart®hari counted himself among these Vedåntins, or rather, 
Trayyantavedins, as he calls them. The essential reality of things, we read elsewhere in 
the Våkyapad¥ya, is beyond differentiation:57 "With regard to things (bhåva), whose 
reality is beyond differentiation (vikalpåt¥ta), the world is followed in linguistic 
expressions (vyavahåra) which are based on conventions (saµketa)." Here it is stated 
that linguistic expressions correspond to the unreal divisions of reality. Another verse 
tells us more about the division here at stake:58 "Heaven, earth, wind, sun, oceans, 
rivers, the directions, these are divisions of the reality belonging to the inner organ, 
[even though] they are situated outside it." Note that this verse does not prove that 
Bhart®hari was an idealist, that he denied the existence of the outside world. It rather 
states that the divisions of the outside world are produced by the inner organ, and 
therefore by words, as we will see. 
 These few citations show already that, besides important differences, Bhart®hari 
shared one idea with the Buddhists. Both they and he believed that the phenomenal 
world is not real, and owes its form to the influence of words. This idea had of course 
                                                
54 Bronkhorst, 1992a. 
55 VP 3.1.32ab: satyåsatyau tu yau bhågau pratibhåvaµ vyavasthitau. Cf. Bronkhorst 1991: 12 f. 
56 VP 3.3.72: yatra dra∑†å ca d®ßyaµ ca darßanaµ cåvikalpitam/ tasyaivårthasya satyatvaµ ßritås 
trayyantavedina˙// 
57 VP 3.6.25: vikalpåt¥tatattve∑u saµketopanibandhanå˙/ bhåve∑u vyavahårå ye lokas tatrånugamyate// 
58 VP 3.7.41: dyau˙ k∑amå våyur åditya˙ sågarå˙ sarito dißa˙/ anta˙karaˆatattvasya bhågå bahir 
avasthitå˙// 
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been an essential part of Buddhist thought since long before Bhart®hari, as we have 
seen. It is, on the other hand, quite the opposite of the Vaiße∑ika position in the matter. 
We have already discussed the Vaiße∑ika conviction that words do not correspond to an 
unreal, but rather to the real world. Bhart®hari ac[127]cepted the position of the 
Buddhists, but adapted it to his own requirements. 
 Those own requirements are those of a Brahmin, who has the highest regard for 
the Veda and for the language in which it is handed down. Sanskrit, Bhart®hari informs 
us, is the divine language which, unfortunately, has been corrupted by incompetent 
speakers.59 He even mentions an opinion according to which incorrect words are not 
expressive. Referring to some incorrect words, he states:60 "Since they are not followed 
by the educated like correct synonyms, they are not directly expressive according to the 
traditional treatise." It is possible that Bhart®hari did not share this point of view. His 
Våkyapad¥ya also contains the following verse:61 "Some consider the incorrect word 
expressive by way of inference. Alternatively, there is no difference [between correct 
and incorrect words] as far as expressiveness is concerned, but there is a restriction with 
regard to merit and demerit." 
 Words separate things from each other:62 "By force of the [fact that 
understanding has the form of words], every produced thing is distinguished [from 
other things]." "Words are the only basis of the true nature of things and of their use."63 
It follows that "those who know the nature of things see the power of words".64 The fact 
that understanding has the form of words, referred to above, "is the external and internal 
saµjñå of living beings. The consciousness in all kinds [of living beings] does not go 
beyond this measure."65 Here it is to be noted that saµjñå means both "verbal 
conscience, ideation" and "name". The ex[128]pression "the external and internal 
saµjñå of living beings" may refer to them both. Bhart®hari elaborates on the power of 
words in the following verses:66 "The power residing in words is the basis of this whole 
universe. ... Since the difference between ∑a∂ja and other [musical notes] is perceived 
                                                
59 VP 1.182ab: daiv¥ våg vyatik¥rˆeyam aßaktair abhidhåt®bhi˙ "This divine speech has been muddled by 
incompetent speakers." The Mahåbhå∑yad¥pikå (Manuscript p. 7a l. 4; ‘Critical edition’ I p. 16 l. 29 - p. 
17 l. 1; ed. Abhyankar/Limaye p. 20 l. 1; ed. Swaminathan p. 24 l. 19-20) states the same in different 
words: anye manyante/ iyaµ daiv¥ våk/ så tu puru∑åßakter ålasyåd vå prak¥rˆå/. 
60 VP 1.178: na ßi∑†air anugamyante paryåyå iva sådhava˙/ te yata˙ sm®tißåstreˆa tasmåt såk∑åd 
avåcakå˙// 
61 VP 3.3.30: asådhur anumånena våcaka˙ kaißcid i∑yate/ våcakatvåviße∑e vå niyama˙ puˆyapåpayo˙//. 
See the discussion by Houben (1992: 345 sq.), and VP 1.27 cited below. 
62 VP 1.133cd: tadvaßåd abhini∑pannaµ sarvaµ vastu vibhajyate. tad- refers back to vågrËpatå 
avabodhasya in verse 132. 
63 VP 1.13ab: arthaprav®ttitattvånåµ ßabdå eva nibandhanam. 
64 VP 1.171cd: svabhåvajñais tu bhåvånåµ d®ßyante ßabdaßaktaya˙. 
65 VP 1.134: sai∑å saµsåriˆåµ saµjñå bahir antaß ca vartate/ tanmåtråm avyatikråntaµ caitanyaµ 
sarvajåti∑u// 
66 VP 1.122-23: ßabde∑v evåßritå ßaktir vißvasyåsya nibandhan¥/ ... ∑a∂jådibheda˙ ßabdena vyåkhyåto 
rËpyate yata˙/ tasmåd arthavidhå˙ sarvå˙ ßabdamåtråsu nißritå˙//. On the exact reading of this verse, see 
Bronkhorst, 1988: 124. 
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[only] when explained by words, all categories of objects are based on the measures of 
words." The creative power of language is exemplified by the illusion of a circle 
created by a firebrand turned round:67 "It is observed in the case of a torch-wheel etc., 
that the form of an object is perceived on account of words (ßruti), even though the 
basis [of the perception] is entirely different." "There is no cognition in the world that 
does not follow words. All knowledge appears as if permeated by words."68 "It is from 
words that things proceed; [words] create the distinctions [in the phenomenal world]."69 
One might be tempted to think that this last line speaks about meanings rather than 
things; both are called artha in Sanskrit. Bhart®hari speaks however about things in the 
objective world. This is particularly clear from a passage of his commentary on the 
Mahåbhå∑ya, often called Mahåbhå∑yad¥pikå, where the perception of words such as 
‘heaven’, apËrva, and ‘divinity’ are presented as means to infer (anumåna) the existence 
of the corresponding objects:70 "Just as the words ‘heaven’, apËrva and ‘divinity’, when 
perceived, are the means to infer the existence of objects never observed, ..." The same 
three objects — ‘heaven’, apËrva and ‘divinity’ — are mentioned in the following, 
slightly obscure, verse of the Våkyapad¥ya:71 "The sign of the thing denoted is, that 
[129] there is an object corresponding to all words. In the case of words like ‘cow’, they 
say, it is similar to ‘heaven’, apËrva and ‘divinity’." 
 It will be clear from these quotations, that the connection between language and 
phenomenal reality is close. And the language concerned is Sanskrit. But Bhart®hari 
goes further. The fundamental unit of language is the sentence; this is equally true of 
the Vedic sentence.72 This is important. It shows that Bhart®hari does not merely 
postulate a correspondence between individual words and elements of the phenomenal 
world. The link between statements, in particular Vedic statements, and the phenomenal 
world is as important, or even more important. We'll return to this point in a minute. 
First we consider some of Bhart®hari's observations with regard to the role of the Veda 
in the unfolding of phenomenal reality:73 "Different sciences unfold, based on the 
primary and secondary limbs of that [Veda] which is the organising principle (vidhåt®) 
                                                
67 VP 1.142: atyantam atathåbhËte nimitte ßrutyapåßrayåt/ d®ßyate 'låtacakrådau vastvåkåranirËpaˆå//. Tr. 
Houben. 
68 VP 1.131: na so 'sti pratyayo loke ya˙ ßabdånugamåd ®te/ anuviddham iva jñånaµ sarvaµ ßabdena 
bhåsate// 
69 VP 3.14.198ab: ßabdåd arthå˙ pratåyante sa bhedånåµ vidhåyaka˙. 
70 Mahåbhå∑yad¥pikå, Manuscript p. 11a l. 11; ‘Critical edition’ Óhnika I p. 28 l. 8-9; ed. Abhyankar-
Limaye p. 33 l. 24 - p. 34 l. 1; ed. Swaminathan p. 40 l. 11: tatra yathaiva svargåpËrvadevatåßabdå 
upalabhyamånå atyantåparid®∑†ånåm arthånåm astitvånumånam ... Bhavya's Madhyamakah®dayakårikå 
9.5 ascribes to a ‘M¥måµsaka’ the position according to which the existence of such objects is known 
from the Veda; see Kawasaki, 1976: 6-7. 
71 VP 2.119: asty artha˙ sarvaßabdånåm iti pratyåyyalak∑aˆam/ apËrvadevatåsvargai˙ samam åhur 
gavådi∑u// 
72 See Houben, 1995a. 
73 VP 1.10: vidhåtus tasya lokånåm a∫gopå∫ganibandhanå˙/ vidyåbhedå˙ pratåyante 
jñånasaµskårahetava˙// Halbfass translates vidhåt® "organizing principle" (1991: 5) or 
"Organisationsprinzip" (1991a: 126). 
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of the worlds, [sciences] which are the causes of the mental traces (saµskåra) of 
knowledge." The context of this verse leaves no doubt that it actually concerns the 
Veda, and that therefore the Veda is the organising principle, or perhaps one is entitled 
to translate: creator, of the worlds. A comparison with VP 3.14.198ab, cited above ("It 
is from words that things proceed; [words] create the distinctions [in the phenomenal 
world]"), and which, too, uses the verb vi-dhå, shows that the creation of the world is 
essentially a division, a differentiation, of the undivided absolute. Another verse 
explains the relationship between the Veda and the world in the following terms:74 
"Those who know the sacred tradition know that this [universe] is a transformation of 
the word. In the beginning this universe proceeds exclusively from Vedic verses." 
 The world having been created, or organised, by the Veda, tradition (ågama / 
sm®ti) bases itself on the Veda:75 "The texts of tradition (sm®ti), which are multiform 
and have visible as well as invisible aims, have [130] been arranged by knowers of the 
Veda on the basis of the [Veda] with the help of indicators." This implies, for 
Bhart®hari, that the link between tradition and the world is close, too. The world follows 
the rules of the word:76 "Even if [all] philosophies had disappeared, and there would not 
be other authors, the world would not deviate from the rules expressed by the Veda 
(ßruti) and by the tradition (sm®ti)." This implies, among other things, that the rules of 
behaviour are in a way inherent in the world:77 "All duties (itikartavyatå) in the world 
are based on words; even a child knows them because of the mental impressions 
(saµskåra) acquired earlier." The intuition (pratibhå) which is called "meaning of the 
sentence", and which makes us know our duties, can either be the result of verbal 
instruction, or it can be inborn:78 "Whether the [intuition] is directly produced by the 
word or by the result of impulsions (bhåvanå), no one deviates from it where duties 
(itikartavyatå) are concerned." Even animals are guided by this intuition:79 "Under the 
influence of that [intuition] even the animals act. ... Who changes the sound of the male 
cuckoo in spring? How have animals learnt to build nests and the like? Who induces 
wild animals and birds to eat, love, hate, swim, and so on, activities well known among 
the descendants of each species?" 
 These verses have been interpreted to mean that the hereditary knowledge one 
finds among animals and in children is the result of the use of language in an earlier 
                                                
74 VP 1.124: ßabdasya pariˆåmo 'yam ity åmnåyavido vidu˙/ chandobhya eva prathamam etad vißvaµ 
pravartate// 
75 VP 1.7: sm®tayo bahurËpåß ca d®∑†åd®∑†aprayojanå˙/ tam evåßritya li∫gebhyo vedavidbhi˙ prakalpitå˙//. 
76 VP 1.149: astaµ yåte∑u våde∑u kart®∑v anye∑v asatsv api/ ßrutism®tyuditaµ dharmaµ loko na 
vyativartate// 
77 VP 1.129: itikartavyatå loke sarvå ßabdavyapåßrayå/ yåµ pËrvåhitasaµskåro bålo 'pi pratipadyate// 
78 VP 2.146: såk∑åc chabdena janitåµ bhåvanånugamena vå/ itikartavyatåyåµ tåµ na kaßcid ativartate// 
79 VP 2.147cd & 149-150: samårambhå˙ pratåyante tiraßcåm api tadvaßåt// ... svarav®ttiµ vikurute 
madhau puµskokilasya ka˙/ jantvådaya˙ kulåyådikaraˆe ßik∑itå˙ katham// 
åhårapr¥tyapadve∑aplavanådikriyåsu ka˙/ jåtyanvayaprasiddhåsu prayoktå m®gapak∑iˆåm// 
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existence.80 Nothing in the text supports this point of view. It is true that living beings 
are born with impulsions (bhåvanå) or mental traces (saµskåra) which are linguistic by 
nature, but it would appear that these linguistic impulsions are not, or not al[131]ways, 
the results of instructions in an earlier life.81 One could here repeat Bhart®hari's 
question: What verbal impulsions would change the sound of the male cuckoo in 
spring? Bhart®hari himself answers this question, and the others that accompany it, in 
the following verses:82 "It comes from tradition (ågama) only, which follows the 
impulsions (bhåvanå). As for the tradition, it is different [for each individual] 
depending on the proximity or distance.83 Six forms of intuition (pratibhå) are known, 
depending on whether they are produced by the own nature, the Vedic school, practice, 
Yoga, by the invisible (ad®∑†a), or by a special [cause]." It follows that there is natural 
knowledge:84 "Since knowledge is natural, the traditional religious and scientific 
treatises (ßåstra) serve no purpose whatsoever." This also applies to morality:85 "With 
regard to the two positions ‘this is virtuous’ or ‘this is sinful’, there is little use for 
religious and scientific treatises (ßåstra) right down to the untouchables." 
 Bhart®hari uses the word bhåvanå "impulsion" at several other occasions in the 
Våkyapad¥ya. The "impulsion of the word" (ßabdabhåvanå) is required to set the speech 
organs in motion, to emit an upward breath, and to make the points of articulation strike 
each other.86 The impulsions, moreover, cause the imaginary divisions of the sentence 
which has, in reality, no parts:87 "Although the meaning of the sentence is without 
divisions, the imagined divisions are based on bhåvanå." 
[132] 
 The direct link between words and things explains the effects words can have on 
things:88 "Just as it is observed that colours etc. have well-defined capacities with 
regard to certain things, in the same way one observes that words [have well-defined 
capacities] to remove snake poison etc. Just as they have a capacity to do this (to 
                                                
80 Biardeau, 1964a: 317-18; Iyer, 1977: 62. 
81 One is of course reminded of the abhilåpavåsanå of the Yogåcåras, which is responsible for a number 
of percepts (vijñapti) besides the one of linguistic usage (vyavahåravijñapti). Cf. Lamotte, 1973: 88-89, 
108 (= Mahåyånasaµgraha II, 2; II, 16).  
82 VP 2.151-52: bhåvanånugatåd etad ågamåd eva jåyate/ åsattiviprakar∑åbhyåm ågamas tu vißi∑yate// 
svabhåvacaraˆåbhyåsayogåd®∑†opapåditåm/ vißi∑†opahitåµ ceti pratibhåµ ∑a∂vidhåµ vidu˙//. The 
reading caraˆa instead of varaˆa is here accepted, with Rau's hyparchetype n and the V®tti. 
83 The commentator Puˆyaråja explains: the tradition is sometimes acquired in this life, sometimes in 
another life. 
84 VP 1.150ab: jñåne svåbhåvike nårtha˙ ßåstrai˙ kaßcana vidyate. 
85 VP 1.40: idaµ puˆyam idaµ påpam ity etasmin padadvaye/ åcaˆ∂ålamanu∑yåˆåm alpaµ 
ßåstraprayojanam//. This verse belongs to the V®tti according to Aklujkar, 1971: 512. 
86 VP 1.130: ådya˙ karaˆavinyåsa˙ pråˆasyordhvaµ sam¥raˆam/ sthånånåm abhighåtaß ca na vinå 
ßabdabhåvanåm// 
87 VP 2.116: avikalpitavåkyårthe vikalpå bhåvanåßrayå˙. 
88 VP 1.155-156: rËpådayo yathå d®∑†å˙ pratyarthaµ yataßaktaya˙/ ßabdås tathaiva d®ßyante 
vi∑åpaharaˆådi∑u // yathai∑åµ tatra såmarthyaµ dharme 'py evaµ prat¥yatåm/ sådhËnåµ sådhubhis 
tasmåd våcyam abhyudayårthinåm// tr. Houben. 
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remove snake poison etc.) it should be understood that they also [have a capacity] to 
[produce] merit. Therefore, good people desiring elevation (abhyudaya), should use 
correct words." The capacity to produce merit belongs to correct words only:89 "On the 
basis of traditional knowledge [received] from the well-educated, correct words are 
established as a means towards merit. While there is no difference in expressing the 
meaning, incorrect words are the opposite (i.e., not a means towards merit)." 
 
 
V 
 
The link between words and things having been established, the study of language, and 
of Sanskrit in particular, enables one to reach conclusions about the world. Bhart®hari 
uses the words of Patañjali, who says in his Mahåbhå∑ya:90 "We accept the word as 
authority. What the word says is authoritative for us." Exactly the same phrase can be 
found in the Íåbara Bhå∑ya,91 but Bhart®hari clearly gives it a wider interpretation. His 
Våkyapad¥ya observes:92 "People accept the word as authority; they are followed [in 
this] by the religious and scientific treatises (ßåstra)." 
 We return to Bhart®hari's acceptance as the sentence as primary linguistic unit. 
This implies that the phenomenal world corresponds to statements, first of all Vedic 
statements. This explains that, according to Bhart®hari, injunctions and other rules are 
somehow built into the phenomenal world. Individual words do not constitute 
injunctions, or [133] ßåstras, or rules of behaviour for animals and men. And it is 
through its sentences that the Veda becomes what it is. If the world is created, or 
organised, in accordance with the Veda, Vedic sentences must be meant, not just 
individual Vedic words. Bhart®hari follows therefore Någårjuna in extending the 
correspondence between language and phenomenal reality beyond mere words, so as to 
include sentences. 
 But here a new difficulty comes up. Någårjuna had brought to light the 
contradictions connected with such a procedure. How does Bhart®hari deal with these 
difficulties? Some passages of the Våkyapad¥ya show that its author was very much 
aware of them, and that he offered solutions to them. According to one of these 
solutions, objects of words have metaphorical existence, which shows their form in 
past, present, and future. It is therefore a metaphorically existing sound which is 
                                                
89 VP 1.27: ßi∑†ebhya ågamåt siddhå˙ sådhavo dharmasådhanam/ arthapratyåyanåbhede vipar¥tås tv 
asådhava˙// tr. Houben. 
90 Mbh I p. 11 l. 1-2; p. 366 l. 12-13: ßabdapramåˆakå vayam/ yac chabda åha tad asmåkaµ pramåˆam/. 
91 ÍåbBh 3.1.36 (p. 184); cp. 6.1.3 (p. 183), 6.2.6 (p. 228), 10.5.73 (p. 431). 
92 VP 3.7.38cd: ßabdapramåˆako loka˙ sa ßåstreˆånugamyate. 
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produced.93 The problem of the road to be travelled can be solved in a similar manner. 
Another solution can be found in the Jåtisamuddeßa of the Våkyapad¥ya. Words, 
according to this section, always refer to universals (jåti). Universals, in their turn, play 
an active role in bringing about the manifestation of the objects to which they belong:94 
"Nothing comes into existence which has no universal; the universal urges the causes to 
manifest itself." Seen in this way, the word ‘sound’ in "The sound is produced" refers to 
the universal, and there is no contradiction, even on the assumption that words must 
necessarily refer to something existing. Bhart®hari may have thought of a transitive 
phrase such as "He produces a sound", for one of his verses refers explicitly to the 
grammatical object (karman). The verse reads:95 "The universal is also effective with 
regard to a grammatical object that is being produced; it urges the action to bring about 
the object in which it resides." In the Sådhanasamuddeßa again another solution is 
offered, on the assumption this time that words refer to individuals:96 "On the 
assumption that the meaning of the word is the individual, it is established [134] that 
the grammatical object which is being produced, for example sound, is the means 
(sådhana); this is done on the basis of mental form." It is clear that here, once again, 
Bhart®hari addresses the problem raised by Någårjuna.97 
 
 
VI 
 
We have to address one final, but very important, question. What reason is there to 
believe that Bhart®hari borrowed his ideas on the role of language primarily from the 
Buddhists? There can be no doubt that several elements of his views have parallels in 
Brahmanical literature, too. Consider, for example, the idea of the Veda as creator, or 
organising principle, of the world. Halbfass (1991: 5) draws in this connection attention 
to the fact that the Manusm®ti, too, characterises the Veda as an organising and 
sustaining principle, and even as the real basis of the social and natural world.98 He then 
adds: "It would be wrong to view such statements as merely metaphorical. The Veda is 
                                                
93 VP 3.3.39 ff. Cp. Bronkhorst, 1992a: 67 f. 
94 VP 3.1.25: na tad utpadyate kiµcid yasya jåtir na vidyate/ åtmåbhivyaktaye jåti˙ kåraˆånåµ 
prayojikå//. 
95 VP 3.1.27: nirvartyamånaµ yat karma jåtis tatråpi sådhanam/ svåßrayasyåbhini∑pattyai så kriyåyå˙ 
prayojikå//. The translation of this verse in Bronkhorst, 1991: 14 has to be corrected. 
96 VP 3.7.7: vyaktau padårthe ßabdåder janyamånasya karmaˆa˙/ sådhanatvaµ tathå siddhaµ 
buddhirËpaprakalpitam//. 
97 According to Helåråja ad VP 3.1.27, the solution proposed in VP 3.7.7 is that of metaphorical 
existence, the same solution therefore as that of VP 3.3.39 f. 
98 See, e.g., Manu 1.21: sarve∑åµ tu sa nåmåni karmåˆi ca p®thak p®thak/ vedaßabdebhya evådau p®thak 
saµsthåß ca nirmame//; also Manu 4.256ab: våcy arthå niyatå˙ sarve vå∫mËlå vågvini˙s®tå˙/ "All things 
(have their nature) determined by speech; speech is their root, and from speech they proceed" (tr. Bühler, 
1886: 168). See also Nå†yaßåstra 15.3 (ed. tr. M. Ghosh): vå∫mayån¥ha ßåstråˆi vå∫ni∑†håni tathaiva ca/ 
tasmåd våca˙ paraµ nåsti våg ghi sarvasya kåraˆam//. 
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the foundation of language, of the fundamental distinctions and classifications in the 
world, and of those rituals which are meant to sustain the social and natural order." 
Certain Upani∑adic passages, too, emphasise the role of language in the construction of 
the phenomenal world.99 And already the Íata[135]patha Bråhmaˆa states: "Everything 
here is speech, for by speech everything here is obtained."100 
 Here it is important to remember that Bhart®hari's thought does not belong to 
one single tradition. It is clear from his work that he was acquainted with, and made 
extensive use of, various schools of thought, be they Brahmanical, Buddhist, or even 
Jaina.101 He used a variety of ideas in order to construe his own system of thought, 
which therefore contains traces of all of them, but all of them adjusted so as to fit into 
the resulting scheme. Any parallelism between Buddhist thought and more or less 
similar statements in the Brahmanical tradition, we may be sure, confirmed Bhart®hari 
in the idea that he presented an essentially Brahmanical system of thought. In one 
important way, therefore, it is nonsense to look for Bhart®hari's "true" source of an idea 
which is present in several of his known sources. Yet we should not forget that the 
belief in the close relationship between language and the phenomenal world is 
particularly prominent in, and essential to, Buddhist thought. As I said earlier, these 
ideas are not marginal here, but they belong to the very essence of that which occupied 
Buddhist thinkers for a very long time. Moreover, only the Buddhists had gone beyond 
some vague and general statements, and had incorporated these ideas into systems of 
thought, which Bhart®hari could and did draw upon. It is in this sense that I conclude 
that Bhart®hari is here, as in certain other respects, primarily indebted to the Buddhists 
of his time. 
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